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INSURANCE LAW
W. Shelby McKenzie* &
H. Alston Johnson*

UNINSURED

MOTORIST COVERAGE

Out-of-State Policies
In Snider v. Murray,' the Louisiana Supreme Court resolved a
conflict among the circuits concerning the applicability of the Louisiana
Uninsured Motorist (UM) Statute2 to insurance policies issued and delivered in other states. In a number of decisions, the second circuit had
applied the more liberal coverage derived from interpretation of the
Louisiana UM statute to out-of-state policies when the accident occurred
in Louisiana, utilizing choice-of-law principles to balance the interest of
the states.'
The supreme court in Snider, however, rejected the second circuit's
6
5
4
approach and adopted the reasoning used by the first, third and fourth
circuits. The deceased wa3 insured under a UM policy issued and delivered in Texas when he was domiciled in and his vehicle principally
garaged in Texas. Subsequently, he moved to Louisiana where he was

domiciled at the time of his fatal Louisiana accident. The tortfeasor's
liability coverage was $10,000, and the deceased's UM coverage was

Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Adjunct Professors of Law, Louisiana State University; Members, Louisiana Bar

Association.
1. 461 So. 2d 1051 (La. 1985).
2. La. R.S. 22:1406(D) (1978).
3. Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 463 So.
2d 1313 (La. 1985); Wilson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984); Jones v. American Fire-Indem. Ins. Co., 442 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983);
Sutton v. Langley, 330 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 805 (La.
1976). Federal Courts, applying Louisiana law, also followed this line of reasoning. Stickney
v. Smith, 693 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1982); Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680
F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088, 103 S. Ct. 572 (1982); Fenasci v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981) (dicta); Brawner v. Kaufman, 496 F.
Supp. 961 (E.D. La. 1980).
4. Ricardo v. America Indem. Co., 201 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
5. Richard v. Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co., 442 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
6. Abel v. White, 430 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Powell v. Warner, 398
So. 2d 22 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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$10,000. Under Texas law and the provisions of the policy, the UM
coverage was available only for the amount by which the UM limits
exceeded the liability limits, which in this case was zero. The Louisiana
statute, on the other hand, permits recovery under UM coverage for
the full amount of damages in excess of the liability coverage up to
the UM limits. 7 The second circuit applied the Louisiana statute to
permit recovery of the $10,000 UM limits. The supreme court, with two
dissents, reversed, concluding that even if the Louisiana statute were
applicable under choice-of-law principles the Louisiana UM statute expressly identifies the insurance policies to which it applies. The Louisiana
statute governs only a policy "delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state." 8 Therefore, since the Texas policy under consideration
did not meet the statutory criteria, the Louisiana statute was not applicable. 9
Unrestricted Releases
The supreme court has recognized that the UM insured could compromise his claim against the tortfeasor without losing his right to pursue
his UM claim' 0 and that the tortfeasor and the uninsured motorist carrier
are solidary obligors." With this jurisprudential background, a number
of unfortunate cases arose in which the UM insured executed a release
in favor of the tortfeasor without expressly reserving his rights against
the UM insurer. Louisiana Civil Code article 2203 formerly provided
that the release of one debtor released all solidary obligors unless the
rights against the remaining debtors were expressly reserved. Relying on
this Civil Code provision, UM insurers were successful in a number of
lower court decisions in obtaining the dismissal of suits brought by UM
insureds who had executed unrestricted releases. Having granted writs
in five such cases, the supreme court in Corona v. State Farm Insurance
Co.,' 2 held that an express reservation of rights was unnecessary, finding
that the statutory rights of the insured under the UM statute were in

7. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b) (1978).
8. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a) (1978).
9. On the issue of where an automobile is principally garaged, see Decatur v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 464 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana statute
not applicable to auto temporarily in this state at the time of policy renewal).
10. Niemann v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979). Cf. Pace v. Cage,
419 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982). For further discussion, see McKenzie, Louisiana Uninsured
Motorist Coverage-After 20 Years, 43 La. L. Rev. 691, 723 (1983).
I1. Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982). Cf. Fertitta
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985); Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
425 So. 2d 224 (La. 1983).
12. 458 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1984).
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conflict with article 2203. While this strained statutory interpretation
may be subject to criticism, the issue has been rendered moot by the
revision of the obligation articles of the Civil Code, effective January
1, 1985, which repealed civil code article 2203. Revised article 1803 rejects
the express reservation requirement.
Credit For Payments
A number of recent decisions have grappled with issues involving
what credit is due the UM insurer or the liability insurer for payments
made or due by the other. Fertitta v. Allstate Insurance Co.' 3 is a
significant decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the issue of
whether the plaintiff's judgment against the tortfeasor should be reduced
by the amount of the plaintiff's pretrial settlement with the UM insurer,
when the insurer waived subrogation as a condition of the settlement.
Seeking recovery for injuries sustained in an auto accident, the plaintiff
sued the negligent motorist and her liability insurer, Allstate, plus the
plaintiff's UM insurer, State Farm. Subsequently, the negligent motorist
filed a third-party demand against Allstate for the amount of any
judgment in excess of its $10,000 policy limits, contending that Allstate
had acted neither fairly nor in good faith in settlement negotiations.
Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, plaintiff settled
with State Farm for $32,000 of its $50,000 policy limit. Plaintiff expressly
reserved "all rights" to proceed against other persons and to "recover
the full amount of any judgment or settlement without any reimbursement or payment to State Farm . . . . " The trial court awarded plaintiff
damages in the amount of $48,701.11 and refused to credit the State
Farm settlement against this liability. The trial court further awarded
judgment against Allstate on the third-party demand for the liability in
excess of its policy limits. Allstate appealed, contending that it was
entitled to credit for the State Farm payment. The court of appeal
affirmed, finding that Allstate was liable for the full judgment against
its insured because of its improper handling of the claim. It further
concluded that Allstate was not entitled to credit for the State Farm
payment on the basis that there was no solidarity between Allstate and
State Farm, the latter being liable only after Allstate's obligations were
fully satisfied.
With two concurring opinions and two dissents, the supreme court
reversed. Allstate's liability to the plaintiff, the court held, was not
extended by its improper claims handling. The plaintiff was entitled to
recover from Allstate only its liability policy limits; the judgment for

13.
14.

462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985).
Id. at 161 n.l.
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the excess was on the third-party demand in favor of Allstate's insured,
the tortfeasor. The court further noted that a solidary obligation existed
between the tortfeasor and the UM insurer, State Farm, for the amount
of the claim in excess of the liability limits. Therefore, payment by one
solidary obligor (State Farm) would be credited against the solidary
obligation to reduce the indebtedness of the other solidary obligor (the

tortfeasor). The court recognized that there may be rights between
solidary obligors for reimbursement but held that State Farm's waiver
of its rights inured to the other debtor, not the creditor. It also rejected
the argument that the collateral source rule precluded credit of UM
benefits against the tortfeasor's obligation, distinguishing the UM insurer's solidary obligation created by the UM statute from collateral

sources such as hospitalization insurance.

5

Fertitta dealt with the issue of whether the tortfeasor was entitled
to credit for a payment made by the UM insurer. The converse question,

of whether the UM insurer is entitled to credit for payments made by
tortfeasors and their liability insurers, also leads to troublesome issues.
Questions involving claims against a single tortfeasor and multiple tortfeasors should be considered separately. In the simple case, the plaintiff
with UM coverage is injured by the negligence of one tortfeasor with
inadequate liability insurance. Regardless of the amount of the settlement

between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor's liability insurer, the UM insurer
should be entitled to credit for the policy limits of the liability insurance;

15. It is not clear from the Fertitta decision what, if anything, could have been done
to deny the tortfeasor (and his liability insurer) the benefit of the settlement of the UM
claim. Although the UM insured may prevent subrogation of the UM insurer by settlement
with and release of the tortfeasor, see cases cited in supra note 10, the jurisprudence is
clear that the UM insurer is entitled to subrogate against a tortfeasor who has not been
released. Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981). If it
had not waived its subrogation in the Fertitta case, State Farm could have sought
reimbursement from (would have had the right to pursue its subrogation claim against)
the tortfeasor upon whom the ultimate burden of responsibility should be placed. Since
the court held that a waiver inured to the benefit of the tortfeasor, perhaps the parties
could have achieved the intended result with an assignment by State Farm of the subrogation right back to the plaintiff. Such a result would appear to be consistent with the
revisions of Civil Code articles 1804 and 1892, effective January 1, 1985, which provide
in part as follows:
Article 1804. Liability of solidary obligors between themselves. "If the circumstances
giving rise to the solidary obligation concern only one of the obligors, that obligor is
liable for the whole to the other obligors who are then considered only as his sureties."
Article 1892. Remission granted to sureties. "If the obligee grants a remission of debt
to a surety in return for an advantage, that advantage will be imputed to the debt, unless
the surety and the obligee agree otherwise."
Such assignment of the subrogation claim back to the UM insured as a condition of
the settlement would not be subject to attack as a sale of litigious rights under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2652, since such assignment clearly falls within the exception specified
in article 2654.
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UM coverage is applicable only to the extent that the negligent motorist
is "uninsured and underinsured.' ' 6 Although the UM insurer is solidarily
liable with the tortfeasor, the UM insurer is not entitled to credit for
the virile share of such solidary obligor. 7 An exception, however, should
be recognized to this general rule when the full policy limits are not
available to the UM insured because there are multiple claimants. Under
such circumstances, the UM insurer should be entitled to credit only
for the liability coverage reasonably available to the insured, which may
be the balance remaining after settlement of other claims or a proportionate share of the policy limits or some other amount, depending
upon the status of other claims."'
What is the responsibility of the UM insurer when there are joint
tortfeasors? Is the UM insurer's responsibility determined as though it
were the liability insurer of each tortfeasor or is its responsibility solely
to provide backup protection to the insured against the contingency that
there will not be adequate liability insurance from any source available
to the insured? Is the UM insurer responsible only for the amount of
damages in excess of all available liability insurance or is the UM insurer
liable for the virile share of each tortfeasor in excess of that tortfeasor's
liability insurance coverage?
These complex issues have not been resolved, but recent cases suggest
a solution which appears inconsistent with the rationale behind UM
coverage. In the most recent decision, Farnsworth v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,' 9 the plaintiff was injured by joint tortfeasors, one
with adequate liability insurance for the entire award and one without
liability insurance. The trial court rendered judgment only against the
liability insurer and not the plaintiff's UM insurer. The third circuit,
acknowledging earlier decisions which held that the UM insurer was not
liable if there was adequate liability insurance from any source to compensate the injured insured, 20 detected a "shift in judicial reasoning"
since earlier decisions were based upon the recognition of a solidary
obligation between the uninsured tortfeasor and the UM insurer. The
court concluded that the current jurisprudence places the UM insurer

16. See La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(a) and (2)(b) (1978).
17. Jordan v. Sweaney, 467 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 So.
2d 985 (La. 1985).
18. Cf. Breaux v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1979), as
an example of a case in which the full liability policy limits were not available to the
plaintiffs.
19. 442 So. 2d 1340 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 445 So. 2d 452 (La.
1984).
20. Gautreaux v. Pierre, 254 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Strother v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Fouquier v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 204 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). Cf. Youngs v. Champagne, 348 So.
2d 126 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1209 (La. 1977).
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in the same shoes as though it were the liability insurer of the uninsured
motorist, and the judgment was amended to hold the liability insurer
and the UM insurer solidarily liable. Although the opinion was not
specific, the court apparently intended for the two insurers to be obligated to pay the judgment equally. The supreme court denied plaintiff's
application for writs, and apparently, the UM insurer did not apply for
writs. 2
The Farnsworth decision creates a strange anomaly in which the
insurance purchased by or for the victim to protect against uninsured
and underinsured motorists is used to reduce the obligations of an
adequately insured tortfeasor. The UM statute requires insurance only
for the "protection" of insureds who are injured by uninsured or
underinsured motorists. To mandate such "protection" when adequate
liability insurance is available from any source is unnecessary and incongruent with the public policy represented by the UM statute. The
court should recognize that UM insurance is available only to compensate
victims who are unprotected by liability insurance. The obligation of
the UM insurer always should be secondary to liability insurance. In
Farnsworth, since the liability insurance of one tortfeasor was adequate,
the suit against the UM insurer should have been dismissed without
prejudice. Likewise, in both settlements with and judgments against joint
tortfeasors, the UM insurer should be liable only for the amount by
which the insured's damages exceed the sum of liability insurance available to all tortfeasors.
Other Decisions
Uninsured motorist coverage has been the leading cause of insurance
litigation for a number of years. As such, there was a bevy of decisions
on other issues during the past year. Even though a qualified self-insured

21. 445 So. 2d 452 (La. 1984). The same issue was presented in a different format
in Hebert v. Ordoyne, 388 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs' decedents
(UM insureds of Royal Globe) were fatally injured in an accident allegedly caused by the
joint negligence of Ordoyne (insured by Farm Bureau) and Champs's driver (insured by
Cavalier and Interstate). Before trial, plaintiffs settled with Champs, Cavalier and Interstate
for a total sum of $500,000. At trial, a jury verdict was rendered in the total amount
of $575,000, finding Ordoyne and Champs's driver joint tortfeasors. Farm Bureau's liability
policy limits were $20,000. Royal Globe claimed credit for the $500,000 paid on behalf
of Champs, in addition to the Farm Bureau liability limits. The court held, however,
that Royal Globe was entitled to credit only for one-half of the judgment, applying the
joint tortfeasor solidary obligation principles announced in Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). The standard reduction clause in Royal Globe's
policy for sums received by the insured from other sources was held to be ineffective.
Thus, Royal Globe was held liable for one-half of the judgment, less credit for Farm
Bureau's liability limits. When the insureds received full dollar-for-dollar compensation
for the entire extent of their damages, it is difficult to comprehend why the credit provisions
of the reduction clause offend the UM statute.
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company is responsible for the accident, the insured may recover under23
UM coverage. 22 Injuries resulting from discharge of firearms in a vehicle
or during an altercation following an automobile accident 24 did not arise

out of use of the vehicle, a prerequisite for coverage under automobile
liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Applying the criteria established by the supreme- court in Hart v. Allstate InsuranceCo.,25 a number
of decisions have awarded penalties and attorney's fees against the UM
insurer under Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 22:658.26 Several
cases involved a determination of whether UM coverage was mandated
2 7
under the terms of certain automobile liability insurance policies.

22. Bryant v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 460 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
23. Topole v. Eidson, 464 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
24. Dupuy v. Gonday, 450 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
25. 437 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983).
26. Cloney v. Smith, 441 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So.
2d 608 (La. 1984) (court concluded that the insurer's denial of a claim ffas based upon
a "cursory investigation;" $5,000 awarded as attorney's fees); Savoy v. Chapmann, 441
So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (UM insurer refused to pay its insured for accident
in which liability insurer had denied coverage on the ground that the tortfeasor's actions
were intentional; $5,000 awarded as attorney's fees); Darbonne v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 452 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (no reasonable basis for refusing to
tender UM payment within sixty days; $5,000 attorney's fees increased by $500 on appeal);
Rogers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457
So. 2d 14 (La. 1984) (although insurer's defense raised issue which was res nova, the
insurer's misinterpretation of the UM statute was not a legal justification for nonpayment);
Nelson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 464 So. 2d 1015 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (insurer cannot
enforce policy provision requiring payment of liability limits before payment of UM claim
nor could insurer justify failure to pay the undisputed claim on the ground that the
insured was demanding additional limits which he was not entitled to stack). But see
McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins., 465 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 467
So. 2d 1123 (La. 1985) (court of appeal reversed an award of $40,000 attorney's fees,
finding that the plaintiff at no time prior to trial submitted satisfactory proof of loss to
the insurer).
27. Ashline v. Simon, 466 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d
28 (La. 1985) (auto rental agreement provided that lessor, a certified self-insured, provides
liability coverage for customer in accordance with standard provisions of Basic Auto
Liability Insurance Policy and that customer rejects UM coverage; court held that provision
of liability coverage by lessor required UM protection and that mandatory rejection was
unenforceable); Capone v. King, 467 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468
So. 2d 1203, 1205 (La. 1985) (selection of lower limits with respect to UM coverage for
owned automobiles did not constitute an implicit waiver of UM coverage for non-owned
automobiles; decision does not adequately explain why UM coverage was mandatory for
plaintiff); Antill v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 466 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 468 So. 2d 567 (La. 1985) (court of appeal concluded that "bobtail" policy,
which excluded liability coverage while the vehicle was being used for certain purposes,
was not required to provide UM coverage while the vehicle was being used for an excluded
purpose).
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Capone v. King 28 is the first decision to apply the "anti-stacking"
provision 29 when the automobile occupied by the plaintiff was covered
by both primary and excess liability insurance. The owner of the automobile was using the vehicle in the course of her employment. The
court found that UM coverage was provided by the owner's policy and
by the non-owned automobile liability coverage of the employer's automobile liability and umbrella liability policies. For purposes of the
anti-stacking provision, the court classified all three policies as the
"primary coverage" on the automobile and made no effort to deal with
the specific statutory language, which is difficult to reconcile with the
30
court's decision.
LIABILITY INSURANCE

Automobile Exclusion
The personal liability coverage in a homeowners policy usually contains an express coverage exclusion for automobiles "owned or operated
by, or rented or loaned to any insured." Under unusual circumstances
in which the child was not an insured, it was held that a homeowners
policy provided coverage for a parent's liability arising out of a minor
child's negligent operation of an automobile.3
Business Pursuits Exclusion
The supreme court held that liability resulting from the fall of a
large tree from rental property onto the neighbor's house was not
excluded as a business pursuit under the provisions of a homeowners
policy because maintenance of the tree fell within the exception contained
in the exclusion for activities "ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits.''32

Intentional Injury Exclusion
In 1984, the Louisiana Supreme Court established the ground rules
for application of the intentional injury exclusion found in most liability

28. 467 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (La.
1985).
29. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(c) (1978).
30. For further discussion of this issue, see Johnson & McKenzie, Developments in
the Law, 1983-1984-Insurance, 45 La. L. Rev. 325, 336 (1985).
31. Pizzo v. Graves, 453 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 So. 2d
1181 (La. 1984). The court found that the child was no longer a resident of the parent's
household, and therefore he did not fall within the policy definition of an insured. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc. v. Pinelli, 466 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), is an example
of the usual situation in which the minor is a resident of his father's household. The
court correctly held that the homeowner's policy excluded coverage for the vicarious
liability of a father for the negligent operation of an automobile by his minor son.
32. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Newman, 453 So. 2d 554 (La. 1984).
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policies by requiring proof that the insured either consciously desired
the physical result of his act or knew the result was substantially certain
to follow. 3 3 Firing a pistol in the general direction of the plaintiff from
less than ten feet3 4 and giving the plaintiff's ankle a 180 degree twist"
both were held to be within the exclusion as conduct from which the
36
result was substantially certain to follow.
Obligation to Defend
A number of cases during the past year have dealt with the insurer's
obligation to defend its insured under a liability policy. Several cases
have applied the rule announced by the supreme court in American
Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki,17 that the insurer has the obligation
to defend the insured unless the allegations of the petition unambiguously
exclude coverage. Where the insured is named as a third-party defendant, the obligation to defend may be derived from the allegations of
the third-party demand rather than the original petition.3 9 The obligation

33. Pique v. Saia, 450 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984).
34. Fleming v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 461 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 464 So. 2d 302 (La. 1985).
35. Walpole v. Weathersby, 465 So. 2d 950 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
36. Cf. Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 463 So. 2d 1313 (La. 1985). After an exchange of obscenities and vulgar
gestures, the insured backed his auto in the direction of his ex-wife for the purpose of
frightening her. While executing this maneuver, the insured managed to injure three other
persons, one seriously who was pinned between the insured's auto and an auto on which
the wife had leaped for safety. The court found that only the emotional injury to the
wife was intentional. While his conduct toward the others was extreme recklessness, the
court concluded, there was no substantial certainty that injuries would occur. This conclusion seems questionable. The ex-wife and the others were standing in a group. The
court does not explain adequately how the insured could have intentionally frightened his
wife without inflicting the same injury on the others. He must have known that his actions
would inflict emotional distress on all members of the group. Where some injury is
intended, the fact that more severe injury than expected results should not change the
intentional character of the injuries.
37. 255 La. 251, 230 So. 2d 253 (1969).
38. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knotts, 466 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1985) (under policy excluding "any business pursuits or business property (other than
farms)," the court held that the petition alleging injury from natural gas supplied to a
cotton gin did not exclude the possibility that there was coverage for the loss as a farming
operation excepted from the exclusion); CBM Eng'rs, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,
460 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (broad allegations of the petition did not exclude
the possibility that the insured could be found liable for actions which were outside the
scope of the professional services exclusion of a comprehensive general liability policy);
Moreau v. Moran, 465 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (insurer was not obligated
to defend because alleged action clearly fell within the exclusion for completed operations
and product hazard).
39. Mason v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 461 So. 2d 589 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
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to defend may be determined during the pendency of the original action
in a separate suit for a declaratory judgment filed by either the insured4°
or insurer.4 ' A trial court's interlocutory determination of coverage adverse to the insurer may be reviewed prior to final judgment upon the
42
insurer's application for writs to the court of appeal.
Prior jurisprudence has recognized that the obligation to defend
includes an obligation to appeal an adverse judgment against the insured
when there is a reasonable basis for appeal.43 Bowen v. Government
Employees Insurance Co., 44 recognized that the insurer does not have
the duty to post a suspensive appeal bond for the amount of any
judgment in excess of its liability policy limits. When an excess judgment
has been rendered against the insured, the insurer's duty is to act in
good faith to assist the insured in making his own arrangements for a
suspensive appeal bond and to keep the insured informed of significant
developments.
FIRE COVERAGE,

HEALTH AND ACCIDENT POLICIES

Legislative Developments
In a relatively quiet legislative year, there were a few enactments
of import concerning fire coverage and health and accident policies. The
most significant of the enactments was Act 249, amending La. R.S.
22:213 and 22:215, undoubtedly an attempt to overrule Cataldie v.
Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. 45 As discussed later, the
Cataldie decision, decided during the past term, imposed substantial
responsibilities on an insurer with respect to cancellation of health and
accident coverage when there are pending claims. The decision was to
a great extent based upon statutory language requiring that any cancellation be "without prejudice" to a claim originating prior to the
cancellation date.4 6 Act 249 altered that general statement in the standard
provisions so that the cancellation would be without prejudice to "any
claim for benefits accrued or expenses incurred for services rendered
prior to cancellation. '47 It also added the final statement that upon

40. CBM Eng'rs, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 360 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1984) (obligation was established by partial summary judgment in declaratory action).
41. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knotts, 466 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1985).
42. Moreau v. Moran, 465 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
43. Reichert v. Continental Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
294 So. 2d 545 (La. 1974).
44. 451 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
45. 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984).
46. La. R.S. 22:213(B)(7) (1959).
47. 1985 La. Acts No. 249.
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cancellation, the insurer would not be liable for "any claim for benefits
accrued, or for expenses incurred for services rendered, subsequent to
the cancellation date, ' 48 unless the policy provided otherwise.
Other enactments concerning the health and accident field specify
that, once declined, optional coverage for mental disorders need not be
re-offered to the insured on renewal dates, though the insured may
request such coverage on an anniversary date; 49 and with respect to preadmission evaluations, provide for limited damages for "unreasonable"
delay in certifying the eligibility of an insured for such an evaluation. 0
There were also two relatively minor enactments concerning fire
coverage. Act 506 provides that a material misrepresentation made by
an insured subsequent to a fire loss, as to the value of the contents of
the insured premises, will not void coverage "unless a court of competent
jurisdiction" should determine otherwise. 5 ' Given the final proviso, the
enactment may not actually make much difference, since the court
appears to retain the authority to make such a misrepresentation an
event which will void coverage. Act 938 increases to twenty days the
notice which a fire insurer must give prior to cancellation of a policy,
2
altering the standard fire provisions to that extent.1
Jurisprudence
One decision in this field stands out clearly during this termCataldie v.Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Co." Some very brief
background on the subject of cancellation is necessary before turning
to the facts in Cataldie.
Cancellation of a policy carries with it significantly different consequences from termination or cessation for reasons such as termination
of employment under a group policy with the employer. In the first
place, cancellation is regulated by statute. Prior to amendment by Act
249 of 1985, the standard provisions required by statute included a
cancellation clause in these terms, or terms more favorable to the policyholder:
The insurer may cancel this policy at any time by written
notice delivered to the insured, or mailed to his last address
... and shall refund the pro rata unearned portion of any
premium paid. Such cancellation shall be without prejudice to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
1985 La. Acts No. 213, amending La. R.S. 22:669(A) (Supp. 1985).
1985 La. Acts No. 429, adding La. R.S. 22:657(D) (Supp. 1986).
1985 La. Acts No. 506.
1985 La. Acts No. 938.
456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984).
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any claim originating prior thereto. The insured may likewise
4
cancel this policy on the above terms.1
The retention of a cancellation option by the insurer must be prominently
displayed on the first page of the policy. 5 The insurer may offer and

contract for "non-cancellable"

insurance which may be kept in force

by timely payment of premiums. Such policies are also closely regulated
by statute. 6 Thus, the entire area of cancellation is not one in which
the ordinary principles of contract law hold complete sway, but rather
one, like so many other areas of insurance law, in which the public

interest in the contract is so great that the legislator in effect becomes
a party to the contract as well.

Certainly the insurer is entitled to cancel any policy if the premiums
are not timely paid, but evidence of non-payment must be clear lest it
be accused of having used the excuse of non-payment when the cancellation was really for some other unacceptable reason.5 7 But even a

cancellation for non-payment of premiums requires adequate notice to
the insured so that he will be in a position to decide for himself what
course of action to take in light of the impending cancellation. 8 This
seems to be a more difficult problem in group policies than in individual
coverage. 9
The cancellation rights of an insurer were radically affected by the

decision in Cataldie. The defendant, Blue Cross, had issued an individual

54. La. R.S. 22:213(B)(7) (1959). By reference, group health policies are subject to
the same requirement. La. R.S. 22:215(C) (1959).
55. La. R.S. 22:212(8) (1959).
56. La. R.S. 22:214 (Supp. 1985), which permits use of the terms "non-cancellable"
or "non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable" only when the insured may continue the
policy in force by timely payment of premiums until at least age fifty, or, if issued after
age forty-four, for at least five years from its issuance; and provides that the term
"guaranteed renewable" may be used under similar restrictions, except that the insurer
may make premium rate changes by classes of insureds. Such policies are incontestable
after three years and must contain a ten-day grace period for premium payments. An
insurer which issues such policies must also offer, at additional cost, non-cancellable status
up to age sixty-five. La. R.S. 22:214.1 (Supp. 1985).
57. Modisette v. American Integrity Ins. Co., 297 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974) (insurer's evidence that it had not received premium payments completely controverted
by insured's strong testimony and evidence to the contrary; insurer's case not helped by
its refusal to renew after the cancellation, on basis of "health history" of insured).
58. Tabb v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 361 So. 2d 862 (La. 1978),
overruled on other grounds in Rudloff v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 385 So.
2d 767 (La. 1979).
59. Greer v. Continental Cas. Co., 347 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (group
policy under which individual employee would have been entitled to $300.00 more per
month had been cancelled and replaced by a successor policy, but employee might never
have received notice of the cancellation; summary judgment for insurer on the issue
reversed).

19861

INSURANCE

medical policy with family coverage to the claimant with fairly typical
provisions and premium ($250,000.00 ceiling on major medical expenses,
$100.00 deductible and quarterly premium of some $245.00). 60 More than
two years after the issuance of the policy, the insured's young daughter
was diagnosed as having brain cancer, of which she died about eighteen
months later. During the treatment, substantial expenses were incurred
and some of these were paid by Blue Cross. But also during the treatment, Blue Cross began to increase radically the premium and to decrease
equally radically the coverage. 6' Ultimately, the changes were so great
that the insured had no alternative but to cancel the policy himself and
enter into one that covered only the very ill child and no other family
member. After notice of cancellation, the insured filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking reinstatement of the family coverage on the
terms existing prior to the most recent increase in rates and decrease
in coverage. The trial court granted the request, but the court of appeal
amended the judgment so as to reinstate only the prior coverage for
6
the daughter. 1
The supreme court first held that the insurer's actions "caused" the
cancellation of the policy, for which it must bear "legal responsibility."
Thus it treated the case as one of cancellation by the insurer rather
than the insured. Citing the standard policy provision on cancellation
required by statute, it observed that the Blue Cross policy provision
was less favorable to the insured and had to be treated as amended by
the statute. 63 Finally, it held that the reduced coverage would be prejudicial to the claim for the daughter's expenses which arose prior to
the cancellation. Thus it affirmed the position of the appellate court
requiring reinstatement with respect to the daughter under the prior,
more favorable conditions. The Cataldie rationale was also extended
during this term to a group policy, under which the result might have
64
even greater consequences.

60. Over the term of the policy and prior to the diagnosis of brain cancer, there
had been minor changes in the coverage and premium. The premium went up by $10.00
per quarter at one point. At another point, the ceiling was raised to $300,000.00, and
the deductible was decreased to $50.00. That produced an increase in the premium of
about $75.00.
61. The major medical coverage ceiling dropped to $20,000.00, subject to a maximum
of $10,000.00 in any one year. The deductible increased to $5,000.00. The premium
doubled.
62. Cataldie v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 433 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1984).
63. The Blue Cross provision with respect to expenses being incurred upon termination
called for up to $100.00 in reimbursement or for a forty-five-day period, whichever
occurred first.
64. Cabibi v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 465 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1985). The dependent child in Cataldie died very shortly after the cancellation
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The Cataldiedecision is a prominent example of the supposed maxim
that hard cases make bad law. The court reached what it felt to be an
equitable result on the very difficult facts before it. But the rationale
will have far-reaching consequences. It interjects the judiciary, to a
limited extent, into the morass of premium calculations and coverage
extensions. It suggests, although this must have already been clear from
the statutes, that cancellation is not wholly a unilateral decision by the

insurer.
The decision almost certainly was responsible for the changes wrought
by Act 249 of 1985, but even those amendments will probably not be
the final statement on the subject.
PROPERTY

INSURANCE

At the very beginning of this term, the supreme court decided
Audubon Insurance Co. v. Farr,65 and by that decision gave some new
dimensions to the relationship between a property insurer and its insured.
The home of a Ms. Paul was damaged by the negligence of a driver
named Farr, insured by Allstate. After securing two estimates of the
damage to her home, Ms. Paul contacted her property damage insurer,
Audubon. It paid her $4,412.00, based on its estimate of damage of
$4,512.00 less the $100.00 deductible. She gave Audubon an appropriate
subrogation receipt for the payment, and Audubon's check to the order
of Ms. Paul was paid on August 18, 1978.
Unknown to Audubon, Ms. Paul had apparently also been negotiating with Allstate as Farr's insurer. Three days after the Audubon
check was paid, Allstate's check to Ms. Paul's order for $4,000.00 was
paid. The check had a notation "in payment of property damage of 61-78" (the approximate date of the damage done by Farr). However,
Ms. Paul signed no release document other than endorsement of the
check.
Thus, Ms. Paul had collected some $8,412.000, which was well in
excess of the actual damage caused. For its part, Audubon believed that
it had been subrogated to Ms. Paul's rights against Farr and Allstate
as of August 18, 1978. Thus, Audubon brought a suit against Farr and
Allstate, asserting its rights as the subrogated property insurer to collect
the sum it had paid to Ms. Paul. Farr and Allstate brought a thirdparty demand against Ms. Paul for the sum that Allstate had paid her.

controversy. The claimant in Cabibi suffered from diabetes and would no doubt incur
substantial expenses on a long-term basis. The court ordered that the cancellation be

effective with respect to everything except the claimant's diabetes-caused expenses, and
reserved to the parties the right to seek supplemental relief if an agreement could not be
reached on the future premiums to be paid.
65. 453 So. 2d 232 (La. 1984).
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The trial court granted judgment to Audubon for its $4,412.00 against
Farr and Allstate, and in turn granted judgment on the third-party
66
demand for $4,000.00 against Ms. Paul. The appellate court affirmed,
reasoning that Ms. Paul had subrogated Audubon to her rights prior
to the payment by Allstate, and thus could not release Allstate from
the assertion of those rights by Audubon, even if she had received
$4,000.00 to do so.
The supreme court granted a writ, and reached the heart of the
matter early in its opinion:
[Als between the two insurance companies, which is going to
have the burden of trying to recoup from Paul that portion
which represents a double recovery by her? Although Allstate's
insured was the tortfeasor, the problem was caused by Audubon's insured, who breached the subrogation agreement with
Audubon, thereby enriching herself to the detriment of her
67
insurer.
The court held that the compromise between Ms. Paul and Allstate was
an effective settlement of their dispute, not subject to collateral attack
by Audubon. Then it held that Ms. Paul had subrogated Audubon to
her rights to that release, but thereafter breached the terms of the
subrogation agreement which required her not to settle with or release
anyone responsible for her loss without Audubon's consent. Thus, the
court held that Audubon's remedy was against its own insured rather
than against Farr and Allstate.
In a concurrence, Justice Dixon pointed out that article 2644 of the
Louisiana Civil Code mandated the same result as that reached by the
majority, since Allstate had not been notified of the transfer Ms. Paul's
rights to Audubon by subrogation upon Audubon's payment to her. 6
Absent such notice, Allstate's payment to Ms. Paul discharged its obligation, and it could not be made to pay twice.
The rationale of Audubon Insurance may have surprised some insurers, who might confidently have expected that once subrogated rights
were acquired by payment to an insured, neither the insured nor any

66. Audubon Ins. Co. v. Farr, 443 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
67. 453 So. 2d at 234.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 2644: "If, previous to notice having been given of the transfer
to the debtor, either by the transferor or by the transferee, the debtor should have made
payment to the transferor, the debtor is discharged of the debt." Since this article concerns
assignment of rights and the 1985 revision of the Civil Code articles on obligations equates
assignment and conventional subrogation, there is no reason to expect that Justice Dixon's
view will not continue to prevail under the revised Civil Code articles.
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other party could affect those rights without the consent of the insurer. 69
But the rationale was promptly followed in another case presenting
almost identical facts. 70
It thus appears that the insurer which pays its own insured for
property damage and is subrogated to the insured's rights must give
notice to the alleged tortfeasor, if any and if known, or his insurer,
that the payment has been made and the subrogation taken. If it does
not, it may find that its insured's own conduct will defeat any rights
against the tortfeasor and his liability insurer. This will cause additional
administrative difficulties for the property insurer, particularly when its
investigation had not progressed far enough to permit it to know who
might be responsible for the damage. It would appear that even if it
is uncertain about the final outcome of its investigation, it should put
all potential wrongdoers and their insurers on notice of its payment to
its own insured.
The court in Audubon Insurance no doubt was trying to make the
best of a bad situation and was attempting to do equity between the
two insurers before the court when neither was responsible for the
problem created by Ms. Paul's duplicity. But the result may have a
chilling effect on settlements between an insurer and its own insured.
If an insurer has not yet ascertained who might be responsible for the
loss, can it in good faith pay its own insured (who will no doubt be
pressing for payment) and take subrogated rights? Given the decision
in Audubon Insurance, it takes a substantial risk in doing so that it
will find that those rights have vanished into thin air if the insured
finds out the identity of the tortfeasor before the insurer does. Given
that risk, the property insurer may simply refuse to pay its own insured
until it has information sufficient to permit it to give notice of payment
to the appropriate persons. Such refusal and the attendant delay is not
necessarily in the best interest of the insured under the property policy.

69. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Sonnier, 396 So. 2d 996 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981) and the same case in the supreme court at 406 So. 2d 178 (La. 1981), as well
as the discussion in Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Obligations, 42 La.
L. Rev. 388, 400-02 (1982).
70. Great Falls Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 454 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (insured
accepted payment from own insurer under collision coverage and granted subrogation;
later, insured settled with tortfeasor's insurer; neither insurer knew about the other; the
court held that absent notice to the tortfeasor's insurer, its payment to the insured
discharged its obligation, and it was not liable to the subrogated collision carrier). Cases
in other jurisdictions have divided on these issues. More than a few jurisdictions have
permitted an insurer in Audubon's place to sue an insurer such as Allstate, at least where
there has been notice to the wrongdoer's insurer prior to the payment and subrogation.
See Home Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 71 Ill. 2d 210, 375 N.E.2d 115 (1978).

